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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 16-1588
___________
DARRELL PARKS,
Appellant
v.

ANDREW EDINGER, Medical Doctor;
KEVIN PIGOS, Medical Director Doctor;
FRANCIS FASCIANA, Mid Level Practitioner;
LAWRENCE KARPIN, Chief Psychologist;
DR. CANNON, Psychologist; B. TAGGART, Deputy Captain;
MR. SHERMAN, Lieutenant; JOHN DOE #1 ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY
COORDINATOR, #710756-F1; JOHN DOES #2, sign for warden on #690775-F1;
J. E. THOMAS, Warden; JOHN DOE #3 NORTHEAST REGIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY COORDINATOR OF #710756-F1;
J. L. NORWOOD, Northeast Regional Director;
HARRELL WATTS, Administrative National Inmate Appeal
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 1:13-cv-01834)
District Judge Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
September 29, 2016
Before: KRAUSE, SCIRICA and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 14, 2016)

_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
Darrell Parks appeals from the final judgment of the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. As the appeal does not present a substantial
question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s decision.
Parks, a federal prisoner formerly housed at United States Penitentiary (“USP”)
Lewisburg in the Special Management Unit (“SMU”), sued several officials and medical
professionals at the prison. Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar
with the facts, we summarize that Parks brought claims relating to the denial of adequate
medical treatment for his sarcoidosis as well as his mental health condition. Parks also
challenged his placement in the SMU which, he claimed, negatively affected his mental
state. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for
summary judgment, which Parks opposed. Upon review of the parties’ submissions, the
District Court granted the defendants’ motion. Parks timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review
over a District Court’s order granting summary judgment. 1 See Wiest v. Tyco Elecs.

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1

It is clear from the analysis of the claims and the entry of judgment in favor of the
defendants that the District Court was granting the motion for summary judgment.
2

Corp., 812 F.3d 319, 327-28 (3d Cir. 2016). We may summarily affirm a decision of the
District Court if the appeal does not raise a substantial issue. See Third Cir. LAR 27.4;
I.O.P. 10.6.
We will not repeat every portion of the analysis in the District Court’s thoughtful
and well-reasoned opinion. Briefly, as the District Court explained, Parks failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his claim that he was denied adequate
medical treatment for his sarcoidosis. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001).
Although Parks filed administrative grievances with regard to other medical conditions,
the record reflects that he did not do so with respect to his sarcoidosis. Accordingly, he
did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies as to this claim and thus, it was
procedurally defaulted. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 232, 228-31 (3d Cir. 2004). 2
Additionally, we conclude that there is no substantial question concerning the
propriety of the District Court’s disposition of Parks’ claim concerning his psychiatric
treatment. In the context of an Eighth Amendment claim based on medical care, a
plaintiff must demonstrate deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). “To act with deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs is to recklessly disregard a substantial risk of serious harm.” Giles v. Kearney, 571

2

Parks cites no circumstances, and we find none on this record, that warrant excusing his
procedural default. However, even if Parks had set forth valid reasons for his failure to
exhaust this claim administratively, we agree with the District Court that the record
supports a finding that Parks received adequate medical care for his sarcoidosis.
3

F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 2009). For instance, a plaintiff may make this showing by
establishing that the defendants “intentionally den[ied] or delay[ed] medical care.” Id.
(quotation marks omitted). Although Parks asserted that he was not provided with
adequate mental health care, the record evidence does not support a finding that the
defendants were deliberately indifferent to his needs. Rather, the record shows that
Parks’ mental health condition was consistently evaluated and treated while at the
prison. 3 That he differed with his diagnosis and/or course of treatment does not suggest
that his medical providers were deliberately indifferent to his needs. See United States ex
rel. Walker v. Fayette County, 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979).
Parks also argued that his constitutional rights had been violated in connection
with his placement in the SMU. The District Court did not err in granting the defendants’
motion for summary judgment on this due process claim. A prisoner’s procedural due
process rights are violated when he is deprived of a legally cognizable liberty interest,
which occurs when the prison “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484
(1995). In considering whether a custody classification triggers a legally cognizable
liberty interest, courts consider the duration of the confinement, and the conditions of that

3

Additionally, Parks has offered no evidence to show that the prison officials acted with
deliberate indifference to his health and safety during the brief periods he was exposed to
chemical munitions which may have exacerbated his asthma and/or sarcoidosis.
According to the evidence, Parks was seen and successfully treated for his periodic
respiratory attacks, including treatment that was performed after secondary exposure to a
chemical substance which may have exacerbated his respiratory conditions.
4

confinement in relation to other prison conditions. Id. at 486. Here, there is nothing in
the record to suggest that Parks’ placement in the SMU was improper. Nor are there any
facts to suggest that he was subjected him to “atypical or significant hardship” while
housed there. Chiefly, Parks complained that his placement in the SMU prohibited him
from receiving adequate care for his mental health condition. However, as we noted
previously, the record supports a finding that Parks was consistently treated for his
condition while at the prison. 4
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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We also note that Parks failed to set forth any information from which a jury could
conclude that his placement in the SMU “exacerbated” his mental condition.
5

